Certainly! Here is a rewritten version of the article, preserving the original meaning and length while adding more detail and nuance to each paragraph:
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Villagers, don’t lose hope! We have suffered defeat; we deeply regret that you entrusted your children to us!
Every time these words are heard, they inevitably bring tears to one’s eyes. This is more than just a line from a drama — it embodies the harsh and tragic reality behind the Red Army’s resistance.
In October 1934, after the Central Red Army’s fifth “counter-encirclement” campaign ended in failure, they were forced to abandon the central revolutionary base and embark on the Long March.
展开剩余94%The Central Red Army fought courageously, breaking through three enemy blockade lines one after another. However, the enemy had already set a deadly trap at the Xiangjiang River, aiming to encircle and annihilate the Red Army there.
On November 30, 1934, surrounded by 300,000 troops of the Nationalist forces at Xiangjiang, the Central Red Army was forced into a relentless retreat.
Faced with the local villagers who voluntarily brought food to the marching Red Army, Chairman Mao, with tears in his eyes, uttered the heartfelt apology that opened this story.
After seven days and nights of fierce and bloody combat, out of more than 86,000 soldiers, only around 30,000 remained; the waters of the Xiangjiang ran red with blood.
This vividly reveals the extreme brutality of the Xiangjiang battle!
But why was the Xiangjiang battle so savage? What exactly happened during this campaign? And what consequences followed?
Standing confidently before a military map, Chiang Kai-shek declared, “We will bury them right here. This is the grave I have carefully prepared for them.”
In mid-November 1934, after breaking through the Nationalists’ third blockade line, our troops withdrew near the Xiangjiang River.
To cross the river, the army split into two groups: the vanguard forces of the Red 2nd and 6th Corps had already reached western Hunan, while the remaining units planned to cross the eastern side of the river at the Xiaoshui River and then move westward to join the vanguard.
At this point, Chiang Kai-shek predicted our intentions and believed the western route was more likely. He consequently gathered 300,000 troops to form the fourth encirclement line around the Xiangjiang area.
His plan was to wait until our troops crossed the Xiaoshui, then gradually tighten the encirclement around Xiangjiang to trap and destroy us.
This situation put our forces in extreme peril.
Fortunately, our intelligence service intercepted Chiang’s plan, giving us a chance to alter our route.
At a meeting, Chairman Mao proposed, “We should advance north along the Xiaoshui River, reach Lingling, and then circle back to the Jiangxi base area.”
“This plan will catch Chiang Kai-shek completely off guard, and Lingling’s vast terrain offers us room to maneuver.”
Premier Zhou Enlai agreed with this strategy.
So, did the Central Red Army change its direction in the end?
No, they stubbornly insisted on pushing westward to rendezvous with the vanguard forces.
At the time, the top leadership was divided in responsibilities: Li De was in charge of military affairs, Bo Gu handled politics, and Zhou Enlai supervised military actions.
Bo Gu, lacking battlefield experience, blindly trusted Li De, who was sent by the Comintern. Zhou Enlai, meanwhile, had limited authority.
Thus, Li De, a foreigner unfamiliar with China’s realities, held the ultimate military command.
Li De was strong-willed and resistant to suggestions. He said, “I believe the Central Red Army is very brave. We must prove to Chiang Kai-shek that we are not cowards who run away at the sight of the enemy!”
However, Li De only followed map theory without understanding the complicated local geography or conditions.
Moreover, the maps they had were inaccurate, and Xiangxi’s terrain was rugged and complex.
This led to thousands of soldiers carrying heavy loads, struggling through narrow mountain paths, often losing their way.
As a result, the army’s situation worsened, and many soldiers were lost.
However, internal disputes between Chiang Kai-shek and Bai Chongxi in the Nationalist camp worked to our advantage.
The two generals did not fully trust each other; knowing the Red Army was tough, Chiang deliberately slowed his pursuit, trying to push us into Bai Chongxi’s sphere of influence.
Bai Chongxi, without deep hatred for the Red Army, only wanted to conserve his strength and hoped to divert the Red Army away from his controlled areas.
On November 16, 1934, Bai’s Guangxi troops were responsible for defense in Xing’an, Quanzhou, and Guanyang.
A small Red Army detachment raided Longhuguan in Guangxi, causing Bai to send a telegram to Chiang, claiming heavy attacks and fearing the Red Army would enter Guangxi through Longhuguan. He requested troop redeployment from Quanzhou to Longhuguan.
Chiang believed Bai and approved the troop movements.
On November 21, Guangxi forces withdrew from Quanzhou, Xing’an, and Guanyang.
The next day, our scouts noticed the blockade lines between Quanzhou and Xing’an were gone—a golden opportunity!
If our troops could swiftly advance west and cross Xiangjiang between Quanzhou and Xing’an, we could slip past Chiang’s fourth encirclement.
Yet, despite this favorable chance, our forces failed to capitalize on it, ultimately having to fight a desperate last stand.
Since the scouts carried no telegraph equipment, they had to run quickly back to the main army. The core forces only learned of this news on November 25.
At that time, the Central Military Commission convened and decided to seize the opportunity by crossing Xiangjiang between Quanzhou and Xing’an.
The core central column was to cross at Jieshou ferry with the following deployment:
The 1st Column, mainly the Red 1st Corps, would act as the vanguard to capture Quanzhou and hold the ferry, protecting the crossing of the main force.
The 2nd Column, the central core first column, would move forward via Leikou Pass carrying the luggage.
The 3rd Column, comprising the Red 3rd Corps, the central core second column, and the 34th Division of the Red 5th Corps, would seize Guanyang and advance toward Xing’an to cover and support the main crossing.
The 4th Column, the Red 8th and 9th Corps, would move toward Yongming and then to Xing’an to distract the enemy.
On November 25, 1934, He Jian, commander of the Hunan army, noticed Bai Chongxi’s troops had withdrawn and urgently called Chiang, demanding the troops be sent back to defend Xing’an and Guanyang.
Bai, annoyed, marched north again, blaming his troops: “Three days were given to pass Quanzhou, yet you haven’t done it—are you making things difficult for me?”
He Jian, who had personally killed many Red Army family members including Mao’s wife Yang Kaihui, was determined to annihilate the Red Army this time.
He rushed his forces to Quanzhou to prevent Red troops from taking strategic terrain.
Since He Jian’s troops were closer, they arrived six hours ahead of the Red 1st Corps and took control of Quanzhou first.
Nevertheless, the Red 1st Corps pushed forward rapidly and by November 27 had crossed the river, securing all ferry points between Jiaoshanpu and Jieshou.
The next day, the Red 3rd Corps crossed Xiangjiang and took control of Guanghuapu south of Jieshou.
Between Red 1st and 3rd Corps lay four ferry points awaiting the arrival of the central core forces.
Because of stark disparities in troop numbers, weapons, ammunition, supplies, and food, and the unfavorable terrain near Xiangjiang, guerrilla tactics were difficult to implement, placing our forces at a disadvantage.
At this moment, the enemy had yet to launch a full attack, and even if they did, we could hold temporarily. If we seized the opportunity to cross quickly, losses could be minimized.
Yet, that opportunity was lost, leading to heavy casualties.
The main reason was the heavy logistical burden slowing down our march.
Under Li De’s orders, the troop movement resembled a massive relocation rather than a combat maneuver.
Beyond essential ammunition and weapons, they carried machinery, printing presses, sewing machines, and other non-essential equipment.
One single machine, called “X machine,” required over ten men to carry. In total, about 10,000 people were tasked just with transport, greatly delaying progress.
The core column often covered only one mountain pass per night. On November 26 and 27, they advanced merely 14 kilometers, yet still had over 80 kilometers to reach the river crossing.
Chairman Mao again urged Li De and Bo Gu, “Drop the unnecessary baggage. These machines are nothing compared to our soldiers’ lives.”
However, both rejected his plea. Li De clung to the equipment and commanded the troops to hurry forward.
Mao angrily rebuked Li De: “You are sending our children to die for nothing!”
Commander Peng Dehuai of the Red 3rd Corps repeatedly sent telegrams urging the core forces to quicken their pace. Still, Li De refused to abandon the heavy gear, prompting Peng to call it “carrying coffins.”
The situation became increasingly critical.
With both sides speeding up movements, the territorial disposition became:
The Hunan army first took Quanzhou, forcing the Red 1st Corps to set up a defensive line south of Quanzhou at Jiaoshanpu, a series of small hills inferior to Quanzhou’s terrain.
The Guangxi troops occupied Xing’an, while the Red 3rd Corps held Jieshou north of Xing’an and built a defensive position at Guanghuapu between the two towns. Though the terrain was low, it was the best barrier to block the Guangxi troops’ northward advance.
The Guangxi army controlled Guanyang, with the Red 3rd Corps’ 5th Division establishing a defense in Xinyu town.
The 34th Division of the Red 5th Corps set positions near Yong’an Pass and Leikou Pass.
Chiang’s forces had advanced to Daoxian, ready to push westward.
The Red 8th and 9th Corps were advancing toward Yongming.
The two sides were now fully engaged, and from November
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